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We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence
of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can
permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as
a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a
comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities
can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first
and the others follow later. Finally, we show the possibility of complementarity between two modes
of offshoring: FDI and offshore outsourcing.
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In recent years, we have seen many ﬁrms in developed countries move some of their production ac-
tivities to developing countries where wages and costs of production are much lower. This oﬀshoring
of production, in many cases, has taken place within the same ﬁrm that already is or becomes a
multinational. In many other cases, certain activities have been contracted out or “outsourced” to
other ﬁrms in developing countries. The key questions here are: (1) What type of ﬁrms oﬀshore and
which among them actually outsource? (2) What industry characteristics result in the incentives
to oﬀshore and outsource? Recent work by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003 and 2005), Antras
(2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) have provided us with deep insights into these issues.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) focus on the tradeoﬀ between integration and outsourcing with-
out being explicit about oﬀshoring. In their model, vertical integration has a high cost of gover-
nance, while outsourcing involves costly search for partners with input suppliers facing a hold up
problem due to imperfect contracting. Grossman and Helpman, in that paper, show how the opti-
mal organizational form depends on the eﬃciency of search technology, distribution of bargaining
power, degree of substitutability between products etc. In another paper, Grossman and Helpman
(2005) study the determinants of the location of outsourced activity (domestic versus foreign).
They show that the extent of international outsourcing depends on the thickness of domestic and
foreign markets for input suppliers, the relative costs of searching in each market, the relative cost
of customizing inputs, and the nature of the contracting environment. Grossman and Helpman
(2003) combine elements of Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Grossman and Helpman (2005) to
study the determinants of the choice between oﬀshore outsourcing and foreign direct investment
(FDI). Antras (2003) studies how the choice between oﬀshore integration and oﬀshore outsourcing
is aﬀected by industry characteristics. Most importantly, he shows that the beneﬁts of integration
outweigh the beneﬁts of outsourcing in capital-intensive industries. Antras and Helpman (2004)
expand the set of organizational forms to four: domestic vertical integration, domestic outsourc-
ing, oﬀshore vertical integration, and oﬀshore outsourcing, and show how variations in industry
1characteristics aﬀect organizational choice.1
What remains unanswered is what starts this process of oﬀshore outsourcing, and thereafter
what determines its dynamics. Based on casual empiricism, we believe that temporary shocks can
trigger this process but the eﬀects of such shocks can be permanent. For example, a few home-grown
Indian IT groups, namely companies such as Wipro, TCS and Infosys, have become powerful players
in the market for oﬀshore IT services. After getting their big breaks from the subcontracting by
overloaded western ﬁrms during the Y2K software crisis at the turn of the millennium, they are now
beginning to “expand beyond core IT maintenance and support work into helping multinationals,
for instance, to roll out new software applications”(The Economist, December 11, 2003).2 The
Y2K crisis can be viewed as a temporary shock which increased the net beneﬁts to American ﬁrms
from outsourcing, due to a shortage of programmers in the US. This led ﬁrms to outsource to India
which had a vast available pool of programmers. This outsourcing kept increasing well after the
Y2K problem became a thing of the past.
The fact that a temporary shock had a permanent eﬀect on outsourcing suggests the existence
of externalities (external economies). We believe that as more ﬁrms from the North oﬀshore their
production activities to a country in the South, productivity in such activities of workers in the
Southern country increases. The possible explanations for this increase in productivity are the
standard ones for external economies, based on labor-market pooling, knowledge spillovers and
learning by doing. Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian (2001), in their case studies of the “new
silicon valleys” in India, Israel, Ireland and China clearly recognize “external eﬀects among the
technology ﬁrms located there” as a central feature of their activities. They deﬁne a local external
eﬀect as “anything that raises the return to particular ﬁrms located in a region as a result of the
location of other ﬁrms in the same region.” They believe that such eﬀects are direct and indirect.
While direct eﬀects take place “when managers and technologists learn about market or technical
1For a simple overview, within a uniﬁed framework, of the property rights approach applied to international trade
settings and its insights, see Antras (2005).
2See also Arora and Gambardella (2004).
2developments from colleagues in neighboring ﬁrms, when ﬁrms in closely related industries serve
as one another’s suppliers and so on,” indirect eﬀects “arise from increasing returns to scale in the
supply of key inputs”, a “thick labor market” etc. NASSCOM ﬁgures show that revenue per worker
in the Indian software industry has been increasing very rapidly from $14833 in 1997 to $37242
in 2000.3 This increase in productivity in the presence of rising employment and output in this
industry should be indicative of at least some industry-level increasing returns to scale.4’ 5
In our analysis, we incorporate these external economies.6 Northern ﬁrms choose between
3See Athreye (2004).
4Arora and Gambarella (2004), in their case study of the Indian software industry, write “In addition to the
standard beneﬁts from specialization according to comparative advantage, one must also reckon the beneﬁts from
increasing returns to scale and from possible productivity increases as Indian ﬁrms learn and gain experience.”
They further write “Moreover, the growth of the software industry has provided the basis for the growth of a new
entrepreneurial model, which has in turn had spillovers for related activities, such as business services and even
some types of R&D tasks.” They also mention the possibility of “spillovers or scale economies, associated with
agglomeration of human capital”.
5Another source of external economies is labor market pooling. The importance of labor-market pooling in the
Indian software industry also needs to be emphasized. Balasubramaniam (2004) mentions a survey of 52 software ﬁrms
in Bangalore, India in which almost 50% believed that the availability of high-tech professionals and the presence
of research institutes was the most important reason for their decision to locate there. In his case study of the
Bangalore cluster, he emphasizes the extreme importance of t h e“ M a r s h a l l i a nt y p es c a l ee c onomies or externalities”.
The reason, according to him why most young software engineers like to work in Bangalore is not better employment
opportunities but “the opportunity to commune with other software engineers located in the city”. This provides
them with opportunities to remain up to date with the latest scientiﬁc developments and learn from each other.
Also, turnover rates of employees are reported to be as high as 30 percent, which promote knowledge spillovers in
the industry.
6In a series of papers, Eaton and Panagariya (1979) and Panagariya (1980, 1981, 1986a and b) analyze the
positive and normative implications of introducing external economies in diﬀerent types of trade models. Ethier
(1982) provides microfoundations for external economies based on division of labor through the expansion of the
market for nontradable, diﬀerentiated inputs whose production is subject to ﬁrm-level increasing returns to scale.
An application of this approach is a model with two ﬁnal goods - a high-tech good (produced using nontradable,
diﬀerentiated inputs in turn produced under ﬁrm-level increasing returns to scale) and a low-tech good (produced
3oﬀshoring their input production to the South and at the other extreme, staying fully domestic.
As more ﬁrms oﬀshore, productivity of labor in this activity in the South increases. We allow
ﬁrms in the North to diﬀer in their productivity levels in converting their inputs into ﬁnal output.7
While in one model, we allow oﬀshoring to take place within each ﬁrm, in the second, in place of
FDI, we allow for true oﬀshore outsourcing with the problem of incomplete contracts between the
ﬁnal output ﬁrm and the input supplier fully modeled, as in the work of Grossman and Helpman
(2002, 2003 and 2005), Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004). We present also a third
model where we allow both FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing (in addition, of course, to the domestic
production of inputs). We assume in that model that Southern productivity in input production
increases in aggregate FDI and outsourcing, resulting in a complementarity between the two forms
of oﬀshoring.
In our models, due to the externalities in the production of inputs, there are multiple equilibria
-an oo ﬀshoring/outsourcing equilibrium and another with oﬀshoring/outsourcing by the most
productive ﬁrms. Once we introduce some simple dynamics (similar to those based on adaptive
expectations), we ﬁnd that an implication of the presence of multiple equilibria is that a temporary
shock can have a permanent eﬀect, i.e. it can move the economy from a no oﬀshoring/outsourcing
equilibrium to one with a substantial amount of oﬀshoring/outsourcing, which is consistent with
what we see in the case of the Indian IT industry. The ﬁrms that oﬀshore are ﬁrms with a higher
intrinsic productivity level in the production of the ﬁnal good. Due to the heterogeneity in the
productivity levels of the ﬁnal output ﬁrms in the North, the ﬁrst to oﬀshore are the most productive
using capital and labor under constant returns to scale), in Rodrik (1996). In that model, he ﬁnds the possibility
of the existence of coordination failures (multiple equilibria), which can be tackled using investment subsidies or a
minimum wage policy. Similar arguments using a similar model have been made independently by Rodriguez-Clare
(1996a).
7Several recent papers such as Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004),
Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) have explored the implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity for international
trade. Further, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity into a model with endogenous
ﬁrm choice between exports and FDI. See also Yeaple (2005).
4ﬁrms, followed by the next most productive ones and so on.
The dynamics generated in our model are roughly consistent with the numbers shown in the
table below. A temporary or a permanent shock in the example we work out leads to acceleration in
oﬀshoring until about the middle of the process and then things start slowing down as we approach
the new steady state.
Table: Growth of Indian ITES-BPO Exports








We believe that the main feature, to be taken really seriously, of the dynamics generated by our
model is the continuation of oﬀshoring well after the temporary shock hits the economy. Figure
1 shows recent computer and business services insourcing (exports) and outsourcing (imports) for
India and Ireland.8 While in India, things were initiated by the Y2K crisis and the dotcom bubble,
in Ireland in addition certain tax breaks given in thel a t en i n e t i e sw e r er e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h es u r g e
in the exports of business and computer services. Figure 2 shows us the movements in software
exports as a share of sales for India for the period 1993-2002. After remaining roughly constant
until 1997, this share has continued to rise.9 As we see from these charts, the growth in these
exports has not been reversed in India or in Ireland so far even though the Y2K and the dotcom
8These ﬁgures are from the point of view of Ireland and India. For example, the ﬁgures on insourcing reported
for India will consist of outsourcing by the US (and other countries) to India.
9T h es o u r c eo ft h ed a t af o rt h i sﬁgure is Arora and Gambardella (2005). While table 2 does not show ﬁgures for
Ireland, the interested reader might want to know that such a clear trend was not there for Irish exports of software.
5were temporary shocks, and the tax breaks to insourcing into Ireland were very partially reversed in
response to protests from other European countries. Another interesting thing to note here is that
outsourcing (imports) of these services from these countries to other countries shows a declining
trend during the same period, probably conﬁrming our belief regarding positive external economies
due to which the dependence of these countries on foreign computer and business services declined.
Another result in our paper, which we ﬁnd interesting, is the one that looks at the implications
of the complementarity between FDI and outsourcing. Let us suppose that we are stuck in the “no
outsourcing” equilibrium to begin with when ﬁrms are not allowed the option of FDI. When the
option of both FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing are available, we move to an equilibrium in which FDI
and outsourcing are going on at the same time in addition to full domestic production by some
ﬁrms.10 Also, in equilibrium high productivity ﬁrms do FDI while somewhat lower productivity
ﬁrms do outsourcing. The least productive ﬁrms procure their inputs domestically. These results
are also consistent with our experience in recent years. The business of shifting back-oﬃce functions
oﬀshore began in earnest in the early 1990s when companies such as American Express, British
Airways, General Electric, and Swissair set up their own “captive” outsourcing operations in India
(Economist, Dec 11, 2003). This “captive” outsourcing is nothing but FDI. In other words, each of
these ﬁrms set up a wholly owned subsidiary to get their back-oﬃce functions done in India. This
FDI was followed by the emergence of the provision of these services at arm’s length by domestic
Indian ﬁrms. Additionally, if we look at the type of MNCs that have captive units (for IT enabled
services) in India we ﬁnd that they tend to be the larger (more productive) ﬁrms in their respective
[Again, the source is Arora and Gambardella (2005).] There was a steady rise in this share in Ireland from 1991 all
the way through 1997, a fairly large fall between 1997 and 1998, after which it remained constant until 2000 and then
there was an increase for the next two years.
10Patibandla and Peterson (2002) argue that the increase in labor productivity in the Indian software industry has
happened through learning and spillover eﬀects of multinational enterprises in this industry, Athreye (2004) considers
this to be conscious R&D and investment in physical capital in response to a labor shortage. In any event, this
increase in productivity is signiﬁcant and in the presence of a rapid increase in overall output, we do not believe we
can rule out economies of scale at the industry level.
6sectors.11
In this context of complementarity between FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing, it is useful to mention
the case study by Athreye (2002) on the role of multinational ﬁrms in the evolution of the Indian
software industry. She discusses two ways in which the multinationals contributed to an overall
increase in productivity in this industry. She argues that while their direct contribution was in
pioneering business models that Indian ﬁrms successfully imitated, their indirect contribution was
through the creation of labor shortages and through that “the emergence of a professional ‘culture’
which put the onus of retaining competitiveness upon organizational learning and the development
of distinctive capabilities by domestic ﬁrms.” A subsidiary of Citibank, namely Citibank Overseas
Software, which was established in India to carry out Citibank’s worldwide computerization showed
actual and potential domestic ﬁrms “the possibility of oﬀshore computerization with the main
software written in India and travelling to onsite locations only to implement the computerization.”
Also, the “repeatability of certain aspects of computerization” was an attractive feature that added
to the proﬁtability of the industry. Similar knowledge also ﬂowed from the Indian subsidiary of
Texas Instruments. Infosys and Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) were the ﬁrst domestic ﬁrms to
incorporate this oﬀshoring model of doing business with tremendous success.12’ 13
Finally, it is important to mention the paper by Markusen and Venables (1999) that is related
11Examples of large ﬁrms engaging in FDI in India are the following: (1) Banking and Finance - Fidelity, JP
Morgan, Bank of America, American Express, HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, ABN AMRO, Goldman Sachs,
Prudential, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Lloyd TSB, Lehman brothers. (2) Technology and Telecom - HP,
IBM, Dell, Samsung, Honeywell. (3) Automotive and Heavy Machinery: - GM, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Hyundai,
Caterpillar, Bechtel. (4) Pharmaceuticals/Biotech and Healthcare - Visionhealth source, Eli Lilly, Astra Zeneca,
Pﬁzer. Source: NASSCOM
12In addition, Arora and Athreye (2002) provide examples of how innovative models of organization and entre-
preneurship from the software industry are spreading to other sectors of the Indian economy. This an economywide
productivity spillover.
13See also Pack and Saggi (2001) for an in-depth analysis of the implications of technology diﬀusion from a ﬁrm in
the North to an input supplier in the South through outsourcing. Furthermore, the eﬀects of outsourcing from the
North to the South on Northern innovation is analyzed by Glass and Saggi (2001). Also, see Sener and Sayek (2004).
7to our work in that they develop an analytical framework to examine how an FDI project aﬀects
local ﬁrms in the same industry through backward linkages that strengthen supplier ﬁrms.14’ 15
Our paper diﬀers substantially from the Markusen-Venables paper in that we do not explicitly
model linkage eﬀects like they do. However, while they focus on FDI, we look at both FDI and
oﬀshore outsourcing (with incomplete contracting between the Northern ﬁnal output and Southern
input ﬁrms) separately and then together, analyzing the complementarities between the two modes
of oﬀshoring. Moreover, while the focus of the eﬀects of FDI in Markusen and Venables is exclu-
sively on the host country, the home country plays an important role in our analysis. Finally, we
incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity, which they do not. This ﬁrm heterogeneity, based on productivity
diﬀerences, in conjunction with external economies can generate our dynamics in which ﬁrms oﬀ-
shore in decreasing order of productivity. The only other paper, to our knowledge, that has looked
at agglomeration economies in the context of heterogeneous ﬁrms is a recent paper by Baldwin and
Okubo (2005). They integrate a standard Melitz-type model of monopolistic competition with a
“new economic geography” model, and show that the more productive ﬁrms locate in the bigger
regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the basic model
where ﬁrms have a choice between producing an essential input domestically or procuring it from
abroad. Oﬀshoring, in that basic model, does not involve any contracting costs, therefore, it can
be viewed as FDI. In section 3 we capture oﬀshore outsourcing (with contracting costs) using an
incomplete contracts framework. In section 4 we derive some dynamic implications of the model.
In section 5 we let ﬁrms choose between FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing, and show complementarity
between the two. Section 6 concludes.
14In a recent paper, Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) ﬁnd stronger linkage eﬀects created by foreign ﬁrms than
domestic ones in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.
15In this context, it is also appropriate to mention the important contribution of Rodriguez-Clare (1996b) who
works out conditions under which multinationals have favorable linkage eﬀects and those under which they create
enclave economies in developing countries.
82 The Model
2.1 Consumption














⎦ + xN,σ > 1 (1)
where x(i) is the consumption of the non-numeraire good i and xN is the consumption of the
numeraire good. We assume there is a continuum of non-numeraire goods and we normalize this
measure of the diﬀerent types of these goods to unity. The above utility function results in the












≡ A, which we assume is taken as given by each ﬁrm but will be determined in








Suppose that one unit of the numeraire good requires one unit of labor. Therefore, the wage rate
is 1.
Let us assume that for each of the non-numeraire goods above, one unit of a specialized input,
y(i), produces α(i) units of the ﬁnal good. Thus α(i) is the productivity of ﬁrm i in ﬁnal good
production, which, for example, may reﬂect the quality of management in that ﬁrm. We represent
9this relationship by the following production function:
x(i)=α(i)y(i) (4)
The input can either be produced domestically in the North or can be obtained from (produced in)
a foreign country called the South. Suppose that one unit of home labor can make one unit of the
input. Therefore, the cost of producing one unit of the input domestically is 1. We do not allow
for domestic outsourcing. We assume that domestic production of the specialized input is done
only through vertical integration because our focus is on the possible oﬀshoring of input production
either through foreign direct investment (FDI) or through oﬀshore outsourcing. The unit cost of




























The equilibrium, maximized proﬁts for such a ﬁrm is
πD(i)=Aσ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1α(i)σ−1 (9)
Assume that in the South φ(n) > 1 units of labor are required to produce a unit of specialized
input, where n is the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀshoring to the South. That is, the Northern labor is
10φ(n) > 1 times as eﬃcient as the Southern labor in input production, φ0(n) < 0 captures the
externalities in the production of inputs in the South16. To avoid clutter, we will write φ without
its argument, except when talking about the dynamic implications of our model. Given the above
deﬁnition of φ, 1/φ is the South’s productivity relative to the North. On the other hand, we assume
that the wage in the South is w<1 because one unit of labor in the South can produce w units
of the numeraire good. As long as φw < 1, which is what we assume throughout the paper, the
South has a comparative advantage in the production of the specialized inputs.17
Let FV be the the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed cost of oﬀshoring production to the South. We assume this
ﬁxed cost to be the same across all ﬁrms. We ﬁrst analyze the case in which there are no contracting
costs of oﬀshoring, and therefore, can be viewed as foreign direct investment (FDI). With oﬀshoring





Therefore, the maximized proﬁto faﬁrm oﬀshoring the production of specialized input is given by
πV (i)=Aσ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1 (φw)
1−σ α(i)σ−1 (11)
16An alternative way to model externality would be to make φ a function of the total amount of inputs produced
in the oﬀshore facilities in the South. This yields qualitatively similar results, however, the algebraic expressions are
slightly more complicated. Therefore, we decided to take the simpler route of making φ a function of the number of
ﬁrms oﬀshoring.
In appendix B we provide a slightly diﬀerent model where externality arises due to presence of economies of scale
in the training of workers in the South. In this case, the training cost per worker φ is decreasing in the number of
workers producing the specialized input in the South. The qualitative results are the same.
17However, all these inputs are not always imported by the North from the South due to the ﬁxed costs of oﬀshoring.
112.3 Equilibrium
The expression for the beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring, gross of ﬁxed costs, for ﬁrm i is given by


















where V represents the set of ﬁrms that have oﬀshored using FDI (international vertical integration)
a st h em o d ea n dNV is the set of ﬁrms that have not oﬀshored. Firm i will oﬀshore if B(i) ≥ FV .
Thus, clearly if any ﬁrm i decides to oﬀshore its production, it must be the case that any other
ﬁrm j, such that α(j) ≥ α(i), will also oﬀshore. In that case, if n ﬁrms end up oﬀshoring their
production, they must be the n most productive ﬁrms (the n ﬁrms with the highest α’s). Let us then
arrange ﬁrms in decreasing order of productivity. We assume the distribution of ﬁrm productivities
to be uniform U [α,α] so that
α(i)=α − λi (13)
where λ ≡ α − α, and α and α are the highest and lowest levels of ﬁrm productivity. In that case,

















where the terms under the integral can be expanded to the following
n Z
0
(α − λj)σ−1dj =





(α − λj)σ−1dj =
(α − λn)σ − ασ
λσ
(15)





(1−σ) (ασ − (α − λn)σ)+( α − λn)σ − ασ
(16)
12It is easy to see that for a constant φ,i . e . ,f o rφ0 =0 , e B 0 (n) < 0 [Proof in Appendix A].
When λ → 0, i.e., when we have no heterogeneity in unit costs, the beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring can











The above expression, under no heterogeneity, but under strong enough external economies in
production in the South (φ0 < 0 and
¯ ¯φ0¯ ¯ large enough) results in an upward sloping e B(n) with
respect to n [Proof in Appendix A]. Clearly, the above expression is negatively related to n if φ0 =0 ,
i.e., if there are no external economies and λ =0 , no heterogeneity at the same time.
Thus, while the external economies in production in the South make the beneﬁts curve upward
sloping, the heterogeneity, with ﬁrms lined up in ascending order of their unit costs (decreasing
order of productivity), makes the beneﬁts downward sloping. Thus, in ﬁgure 3, we focus on the
pure strong external economies case with no ﬁrm heterogeneity. With an intermediate level of ﬁxed
costs of producing in the South, we see there are multiple equilibria - either no ﬁrm oﬀshores or
all ﬁrms oﬀshore. The beneﬁti sl e s st h a nﬁxed costs when n =0and is greater than ﬁxed costs
when n =1 . The point of intersection between the FV and the B curves is an unstable equilibrium.
In ﬁgure 4, there are no external economies, but there is heterogeneity and ﬁrms are arranged
in descending order of their productivities. The point of intersection between the FV and the B
curves gives us our unique equilibrium in this case. The n∗ most productive ﬁr m s( t h eo n e sw i t h
t h el o w e s tu n i tc o s t s )o ﬀshore.
Clearly, when we have both ﬁrm heterogeneity and external economies in the South, there
are two simultaneous forces generated by oﬀshoring. If oﬀshoring is done in decreasing order of
ﬁrm productivity, then net beneﬁt falls due to this reason but rises due to the external economies
generated. When both these forces are present, we need to resort to simulations to study the shape
of the beneﬁts curve. In the simulations we assume φ = be−n. T h ep l o to f e B(n) with respect to
n is shown in ﬁgure 5. This is an inverted U. Figure 5 shows us two equilibria in such a case. In
one equilibrium, no ﬁrms oﬀshore, i.e., n =0since ﬁxed costs exceed beneﬁts. n∗
1 is an unstable
13equilibrium, while n∗
2 is a stable equilibrium.18 In this stable, interior equilibrium the n∗
2 most
productive ﬁrms oﬀshore.
The existence of multiple equilibria due to external economies also gives rise to a lock in eﬀect
of the following kind. Suppose there are two countries in the South: A and B. The ﬁrms in
the North are oﬀs h o r i n gt oc o u n t r yA in the initial equilibrium. Now, even if another country B
becomes a potential source of oﬀshoring with wB <w A (but with same φ(.) function), no Northern
ﬁrm has an incentive to switch sources to B as long as φ(0)wB >φ (n∗)wA, where n∗ is the fraction
of ﬁrms oﬀshoring to A in the initial equilibrium.
3 Foreign Outsourcing under Incomplete Contracting
In contrast to the previous section where ﬁrms in the North could directly produce the specialized
input in the South after incurring a ﬁxed cost FV , we now instead allow each ﬁrm in the North the
option to outsource the production of its specialized input to a ﬁrm in the South.19 However, there
is incomplete contracting between the ﬁnal goods producer in the North and the input producer in
the South who has to produce a customized input that is of use only to the particular ﬁnal goods
producer who placed the order. Once the input is produced, the payment for it is determined
through generalized Nash bargaining20. W ea s s u m et h a tβ and (1-β) are the bargaining weights
for the input producer and the ﬁnal goods producer respectively in this bargaining game. Due to
the highly customized nature of input (that cannot be used to produce a ﬁnal product other than
the one it was meant for and cannot be replaced by another input to produce the output it was
18Stability here is based on what happens when there is a small deviation from an equilibrium. The assumption
here is that the beneﬁt exceeding the ﬁx e dc o s t( p o s i t i v en e tb e n e ﬁt) leads to more ﬁrms oﬀshoring, while when the
beneﬁti sl e s st h a nt h eﬁxed cost (negative net beneﬁt), we get a movement away from oﬀshoring.
19The other option stilll remains the domestic production of the input through vertical integration.
20Neither the quality of input nor the amount of resources going into the production of the input is veriﬁable to
third parties. Therefore, no ex-ante contracts can be written to produce inputs. The reward for input production
must be determined through ex-post bargaining.
14meant for), the threat point of the bargaining game is one where the payoﬀso fb o t ht h eﬁnal and
intermediate goods producers equal zero. We assume that there is a large number of potential input
producers in the South and every ﬁrm in the North that attempts to ﬁnd an input producer can
ﬁnd one by incurring a ﬁxed cost. Let us assume that the total ﬁxed cost of oﬀshore outsourcing for
a ﬁnal goods producer in the North is FO. This consists of search cost, cost of writing a contract
etc.
The production function for the ﬁnal good remains the same as in the previous section which
we recall is
x(i)=α(i)y(i) (18)
Again the wage in the South is w, while in the North it is 1. As before, we assume that w<1. At
home, a unit of labor can produce a unit of the specialized input while in the South φ>1 units of
labor are required to produce a unit of the input.












Since the payment that is going to be made to the input producer is only βp(i)x(i),w ec a nw r i t e
the input producer’s objective function once she has decided to provide the input as:
πI(i)=βp(i)x(i) − φwy(i)=βA1/σ(α(i)y(i))
σ−1
σ − φwy(i) (20)






Plugging the above back into the inverse demand function in (19), we get the equilibrium price of





15The ﬁnal goods producer’s total proﬁt sc a nn o wb eg i v e na s





The equilibrium, maximized proﬁts for a ﬁrm obtaining the specialized input domestically is given
by (9).




























where O is the set of ﬁrms that have outsourced input production to the South and NO is the set
of ﬁrms procuring input domestically. Firm i will outsource if B(i) ≥ FO. Thus, from the above
equation, again clearly if any ﬁrm i decides to outsource its production of input, it must be the
case that any other ﬁrm j, such that α(j) ≥ α(i), will also outsource. In that case, if n ﬁrms end
up outsourcing their production, they must be the n most productive ﬁrms (the n ﬁrms with the








































(ασ − (α − λn)σ)+( α − λn)σ − ασ
(26)
Inspection of (16) and (26) shows the similarity in the two expressions. Again, the presence of
external economies causes the net beneﬁt from outsourcing to be increasing in the number of ﬁrms
16up to a point. Numerical simulations show an inverted U-shape for the net beneﬁt from outsourcing
in the case of incomplete contracts. Therefore, the results derived earlier for complete contracts
g ot h r o u g hi nt h i sc a s ea sw e l l .I nﬁgure 6, we present the beneﬁt curves for diﬀerent values of β.
The recent literature on bargaining theory shows that the value of β c a nd e p e n do nt h er e l a t i v e
negotiating skills or the relative marginal rates of time preference of the bargaining parties. From
ﬁgure 6, we see that for a large majority of values of n (from 0.36 through 1), the beneﬁtc u r v e
under β =0 .5 (intermediate value) dominates the beneﬁtc u r v e sf o rl o w e r( β =0 .25) as well as
higher values (β =0 .75) of β. This can be explained using the above proﬁt and beneﬁte x p r e s s i o n s
for a ﬁnal output ﬁrm in the North, which clearly shows that a higher β has two eﬀects - a negative
eﬀect through a lower share for the ﬁnal output producer in a given joint surplus and a positive
eﬀect through a larger joint surplus from higher incentives for input production. Given the ﬁxed
cost FO assumed in ﬁgure 6, with β =0 .25, we have a unique equilibrium of no outsourcing, while
in the other two cases with higher values of β, we have multiple equilibria - one stable equilibrium
with no outsourcing and another stable, interior equilibrium (n∗ < 1) where the downward sloping
portion of the beneﬁt curve intersects the ﬁxed cost where a fairly large proportion of ﬁrms (the
relatively more productive ones) outsource. The p o i n to fi n t e r s e c t i o no ft h eu p w a r ds l o p i n gp a r t
of the curve and the ﬁxed cost represents an unstable equilibrium. While the interior, stable
equilibrium under β =0 .5 represents more ﬁrms outsourcing than in the same equilibrium under
β =0 .75, the coordination problem is less severe under the latter than under the former in the
sense that a smaller minimum number of the most productive ﬁrms need to coordinate on the
outsourcing to move the industry to the stable, interior outsourcing equilibrium. This minimum
number is given by the number of ﬁrms corresponding to the unstable equilibrium. In other words,
a large share going to the input producers can provide an initial impetus to outsourcing but will
not lead ultimately to a lot of outsourcing.
One possible extension here could be endogenizing β. AN o r t h e r nﬁrm can invest resources in
acquiring good negotiation skills or gaining more information about the institutions in the South,
w h i c hw i l ll e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei ni t sb a r g a i n i n gp o w e r ,g i v e nb yδ =1−β. Let us say the marginal
17cost of increasing δ is constant. We know that because of the opposing eﬀects created by δ, the
beneﬁts, B(i,n), to a Northern ﬁrm for a given n are maximized at an interior value of δ.T h u s ,
the beneﬁt function is locally, if not globally, concave in δ. Therefore, with the marginal beneﬁto f
δ being downward sloping in the relevant region, its intersection with the constant marginal cost
curve will give us the endogenous level of δ. For a given n, a higher productivity of a ﬁrm will shift
the marginal beneﬁt curve to the right, resulting in diﬀerent δ’s (β’s) for diﬀerent ﬁrms, with the
more productive ﬁnal output ﬁrms grabbing a higher share in their joint surplus with the input
producers. Similarly, a tax breakw i l lr e s u l ti na ni n c r e a s ei nδ for all ﬁrms. While such a break for
ag i v e nδ, as explained in the next section, leads to an increase in n in the outsourcing equilibrium,
the resultant increase in the endogenous δ here will lead to a further increase in n - an indirect
eﬀect of the tax break on the extent of outsourcing. For the remainder of the paper, we now revert
back to the assumption of an exogenous β.
Next we turn our attention to the dynamic implications of the model.
4 Some Rudimentary Dynamics and Policy Implications
As discussed in the previous section, in the presence of external economies the model exhibits
multiple equilibria. This has important policy implications. Since the equilibria in the FDI and
outsourcing cases are qualitatively similar, we limit the algebra in this section to that of outsourcing,
however, all the qualitative results are valid for FDI as well. Suppose the initial situation is that
given by ﬁgure 7 and no ﬁrms are outsourcing in the initial equilibrium (n =0 ) . Now the industry
is hit by a positive shock. In the case of functional form assumed for φ (= be−n) ap o s i t i v es h o c k
can be captured by a decrease in b. Alternatively, a decrease in w can capture the eﬀect of a subsidy
in the South or a reduction in the trading cost of importing inputs from abroad. A tax break in
the home country can be captured by introducing a rate of taxation of τ on the proﬁts of Northern
ﬁrms in the model. This will imply that the beneﬁt from outsourcing is multiplied by (1-τ). Now
a decrease in τ will capture the eﬀect of a tax break in the home country. In ﬁgure 7, let the light
18inverse-U shaped curve be the beneﬁt from outsourcing prior to the shock. A permanent shock
of any of the above kind shifts the beneﬁt curve permanently to the bold one. The important
thing to note is that the beneﬁt from outsourcing for the most productive ﬁrm, when no one else
is outsourcing, now exceeds the cost of outsourcing. Therefore, some ﬁrms will start outsourcing
after the shock.
To study the dynamic response of ﬁr m st oas h o c k ,w ea s s u m et h a taﬁrm makes its decision
regarding outsourcing on the basis of foreign labor productivity, 1/φ, in the last period (previous
to the present period) which in turn depends on the number of ﬁrms that had outsourced by the
end of the previous period as follows.
φt = φ(nt−1)=be−nt−1
where the last equality follows from our speciﬁc functional form.21 The downward sloping dotted
lines plotted in ﬁgure 7 are the beneﬁt curves drawn for given levels of foreign labor productivity













(ασ − (α − λnt−1)σ)+( α − λnt−1)σ − ασ
It is easy to verify that the above is decreasing in n for a given nt−1. The ﬁrst dotted line shows
beneﬁts from outsourcing for diﬀerent ﬁrms, in decreasing order of their productivity, but under
the labor productivity corresponding to no outsourcing, i.e n0 =0 . Similarly, the second dotted
line is drawn under the assumption that labor productivity in the South equals the level seen under
n1 ﬁrms outsourcing, where n1 is the fraction of ﬁrms obtained from the intersection of the FO
curve and the ﬁrst downward sloping dotted line. It is important to note that even in this dynamic
context FO is not a sunk cost but a ﬁxed cost, that is incurred every period. Algebraically then,
21Dynamics similar to those we generate can also result from other kinds of frictions, such as adjustment costs that
are convex in the number of ﬁrms that start oﬀshoring every period.
19for a given nt−1,n t in each period is obtained as a solution to the following equation.










(ασ − (α − λnt−1)σ)+( α − λnt−1)σ − ασ
= FO
This way we will reach the new long-run equilibrium where n∗ ﬁrms outsource. In this dynamic
process of convergence to this new, outsourcing equilibrium, it is interesting to note that initially,
a small number of the most productive ﬁrms outsource. This triggers outsourcing by a larger
and larger number of less productive ﬁrms. The process then ends with smaller and smaller num-
ber of relatively less productive ﬁrms outsourcing until we reach our new steady state equilibrium
where the n∗ most productive ﬁrms have outsourced. Therefore, a small shock can take the indus-
try/economy from a no outsourcing equilibrium to one with large amount of outsourcing.
Next we explore the dynamic implications of a temporary shock. In this case, there is a tem-
porary shift in the beneﬁt from outsourcing shown in ﬁgure 8. In the ﬁgure the shock lasts for
3 periods. Again the sequence of dynamics, starting from the most productive and ending with
the least productive, is the same. Such temporary shocks can move us from the no-outsourcing
equilibrium to the outsourcing equilibrium. In other words, these dynamics show that while out-
sourcing can be brought about by tax breaks and subsidies, it cannot be reversed by reversing these
policies. Thus temporary policies can have permanent eﬀects in our model.
As mentioned in the introduction, an example of a temporary shock would be the Y2K problem
which led a lot of ﬁrms to outsource their IT related jobs to India. The amount of IT related jobs
outsourced to India kept increasing well after the Y2K problem became a thing of the past.
5 Complementarity between FDI and outsourcing
When we allow ﬁrms the option of both FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing, we get some interesting
results, in particular, FDI by some ﬁrms may facilitate outsourcing by others. We assume that the
ﬁxed cost of FDI is greater than the ﬁxed cost of outsourcing: FV >F O. For any given conﬁguration
20of ﬁrms doing FDI, oﬀshore outsourcing, and domestic sourcing, ﬁrm i chooses the organizational
form that maximizes its proﬁt, where the proﬁt in each case is given by the expressions in (9), (11)
and (23), respectively. Using(11) and (23), it can be shown that ﬁrm i chooses FDI over outsourcing
if the following condition is satisﬁed.
Aσ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1α(i)σ−1(φ(n)w)1−σ(1 − σ(1 − β)βσ−1) > (FV − FO) (27)
where n is the fraction of ﬁrms oﬀshoring. In order for any ﬁrm to prefer FDI over oﬀshore
outsourcing when the ﬁxed cost of former is greater than that of latter, it must be the case that
σ(1 − β)βσ−1 < 1. This is true for any σ>1. Also note that the l.h.s of the above expression is
increasing in α(i), which simply means that the extra beneﬁt from FDI compared to outsourcing is
proportional to ﬁrm productivity. Therefore, as productivity declines the extra beneﬁtf r o mF D I
shrinks, while the extra cost of FDI is constant. This implies that if ﬁrm i with productivity α(i)
prefers FDI over outsourcing, then any other ﬁrm j, such that α(j) ≥ α(i), will also prefer FDI
over outsourcing. Moreover, in an equilibrium where both FDI and outsourcing obtain, higher
productivity ﬁrms will be doing FDI, while lower productivity ﬁrms will be doing outsourcing.
As e to fs u ﬃcient conditions to ensure that some ﬁrms are doing FDI while some others are
doing oﬀshore outsourcing is
ασ−1 >
(φ(0)w)σ−1(FV − FO)
(1 − σ(1 − β)βσ−1)
ασ−1 <
(φ(1)w)σ−1(FV − FO)
(1 − σ(1 − β)βσ−1)
Suppose the fraction of ﬁrms doing FDI is denoted by nV , the fraction outsourcing is nO, and the
total fraction of ﬁrms oﬀshoring is n(= nV + nO). Now, nV and n are obtained by solving the
following two equations simultaneously.




















= FV − FO (28)





















The ﬁrst equation above is the indiﬀerence condition for the nV th ﬁrm between FDI and oﬀshore
outsourcing. The second equation is the indiﬀerence condition of the nth ﬁrm between oﬀshore
outsourcing and domestic sourcing.
Now, suppose initially the possibility of FDI does not exist, say due to an explicit restriction
by the host country, however, outsourcing is permitted. Due to the existence of multiple equilibria
discussed in the previous section, the industry may be trapped in a zero outsourcing equilibrium.
Now, if FDI is allowed and some high productivity ﬁrms ﬁnd it individually optimal to do FDI even
if no other ﬁrms do FDI, then we get an equilibrium where some high productivity ﬁrms are doing
FDI while others that are somewhat less productive are doing outsourcing. The remaining ﬁrms,
the least productive, produce inputs domestically. This result follows straightaway from the results
established in the previous paragraph. Below is a numerical example showing this explicitly.
Numerical Example: σ =4 ;w = .5;b =1 .5;α =4 ;λ =1 ;β = .75. Furthermore, the ﬁxed cost of
FDI is .3,w h i l et h eﬁxed cost of outsourcing is .1. The net beneﬁts from outsourcing (FDI)
for the nth ﬁrm when n ﬁrms are oﬀshoring are plotted in ﬁgure 9. The net beneﬁtf r o m
outsourcing is negative as long as the fraction of ﬁrms outsourcing is <. 08, therefore, the
initial equilibrium is one with no oﬀshore outsourcing. Instead, if FDI was the only option
then the fraction of ﬁrms doing FDI would be 0.58.
22When both FDI and outsourcing are possible, then the equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms doing
FDI and outsourcing are found by solving (28) and (29) simultaneously, which turn out to be
0.49 and 0.32, respectively. The remaining 0.19 ﬁrms do domestic sourcing. The net beneﬁt
of each ﬁrm in the ﬁnal equilibrium when 0.49 ﬁrms do FDI while 0.32 ﬁrms do outsourcing
i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 0 . I tc a nb es e e nt h a tt h en e tb e n e ﬁt from FDI is higher than that
from outsourcing for ﬁrms i ∈ [0,.49), while the net beneﬁt from outsourcing is higher for
i ∈ [.49,.81). The net beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring is negative for ﬁrms i ∈ [.81,1].
Therefore, the possibility of FDI makes a substantial amount of oﬀshoring feasible. An example
of this kind of phenomenon would be the setting up of captive BPO units by several multinationals in
India in the early 1990s, e.g. British airways, General Electric etc. which spurred the development
of domestic ﬁrms like Daksh, ICICI one source, etc. which provide outsourcing services to foreign
ﬁrms in arm’s length transaction.
6W e l f a r e I m p l i c a t i o n s o f O ﬀshoring
So far we have not discussed the welfare implications of oﬀshoring. It is easy to see that the North
gains from oﬀshoring because it can get the specialized input at a lower cost from the South. As
far as the South is concerned, in the model with FDI as the sole mode of oﬀshoring, the South
plays the passive role of location of production for specialized inputs. Since there is no change in
the Southern wage consequent upon FDI by the Northern ﬁrms, there are no gains for the South.
However, in the case of outsourcing, the input suppliers in the South engage in Nash bargaining and
hence get a surplus. Therefore, even though workers keep getting a wage of w, the input producers
get a surplus which is a source of gain for the South. Moreover, the surplus of input producers is
increasing in the Southern productivity 1
φ. Thus, the greater the amount of oﬀshoring the greater
the gains to the South. Alternatively, one can change the model slightly to allow the workers in the
South to bargain with the specialized input producers (integrated vertically with their respective
ﬁnal output producers in the North) over their wage. (Such a model is presented in Appendix B.)
23Their wage in the numeraire sector, w, will serve as their reservation wage. In this setting, workers
producing specialized inputs will get a higher wage, and therefore, oﬀshoring will provide gains to
workers as well. This extension will also capture the empirical regularity of higher wages paid to
workers in the South who either work directly for a subsidiary of a multinational or for a specialized
input producer who produces under a contract with a multinational ﬁrm. (See Appendix B.)
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we present a model of oﬀshoring in the presence of externalities and ﬁrm heterogeneity.
We show that the incorporation of externalities in a general equilibrium model of oﬀshoring yields
some interesting insights. The externalities give rise to multiple oﬀshoring equilibria. Due to the
presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent eﬀects, i.e.,
they can permanently raise the extent of oﬀshoring in an industry. Moreover, the initial advantage
of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in eﬀect, whereby late
movers have a comparative disadvantage. Also, the existence of ﬁrm heterogeneity along with
externalities can help explain the dynamic process of oﬀshoring where the most productive ﬁrms
oﬀshore ﬁrst and others follow later. Finally, we show the possibility of complementarity between
two modes of oﬀshoring: FDI and oﬀshore outsourcing.
Appendix A





Since α0(n) < 0, the numerator is decreasing in n. The derivative of the denominator with





σλ(α − λn)σ−1 > 0. Therefore, e B0(n) < 0.
To Prove: With λ =0, φ0 < 0, and with external economies fairly strong , we have f B
0
(n) > 0.



















(n) > 0 when
¯ ¯φ0¯ ¯ > [(φw)(1−σ)−1]
2
(σ−1)(φw)−σ , i.e., when external economies are fairly strong.
Appendix B
AM o d e lo fO ﬀshoring with Wage Bargaining in the South
Let us assume exactly the same set up for the North as in the main text. Recall that the
equilibrium, maximized proﬁt for a Northern ﬁrm when it procures specialized input domestically
is πD(i)=Aσ−σ(σ −1)σ−11α(i)σ−1. Northen ﬁrms can alternatively procure input from the South
through a fully owned subsidiary after incurring a ﬁxed cost of FV .
As in the text, one unit of labor in the South can produce w units of the numeraire good.
Therefore, the reservation wage of a worker producing the specialized input is going to be w. In
addition, in order to produce the specialized input the worker has to undergo training. The cost
of training for a worker is φ which is taken as given by a ﬁrm. However, φ depends on the total
number of workers working to produce specialized inputs: LV ≡
Z
i∈V
l(i)di, where l(i) is the number
of workers required to produce the specialized input for ﬁrm-i and V represents the set of ﬁrms
that have oﬀshored using FDI (vertical integration). It is further assumed that φ0(LV ) < 0, which
happens because of economies of scale in training activity. Presumably, there are some overhead
costs of training because of which training cost per unit of labor declines as more workers get
trained.
The wage of a worker producing specialized input in the South is determined by a process of
Nash bargaining between the worker and the subsidiary of the multinational in the South. The value
of output from hiring one worker to produce the specialized input is p(i)α(i). The ﬁrm also has to
pay the training cost φ for each worker. If the ﬁrm procures the input domestically (in the North),
then its proﬁt per worker employed is p(i)α(i) − 1 since the Northern wage is 1 by assumption.
25Therefore, p(i)α(i)−1 is the threat point of the ﬁrm in bargaining with a worker in the South. Thus,
the surplus from the relationship is p(i)α(i)−φ−(p(i)α(i)−1)−w =1−(φ+w). Let the worker’s
share of this surplus be θ. Therefore, the wage of a worker working to produce the specialized input
in the South is wS =( 1− θ)w + θ(1 − φ). The proﬁtf r o mh i r i n gl(i) workers to produce l(i) units
of the specialized input is p(i)α(i)l(i)−(wS +φ)l(i).S i n c ex(i)=α(i)l(i) and p(i)=A1/σx(i)−1/σ,
the proﬁto faﬁrm from oﬀshoring can be written as A1/σ(α(i)l(i))(σ−1)/σ − (wS + φ)l(i). The
ﬁrm chooses l(i) optimally to maximize the above expression. The ﬁrst order condition is given
by l(i)=(σ
σ−1)−σAα(i)σ−1(wS + φ)−σ and thus the expression for the maximized proﬁt under
oﬀshoring is given by
πV (i)=Aσ−σ(σ − 1)σ−1(wS + φ)1−σα(i)σ−1 (30)
The expression for the beneﬁtf r o mo ﬀshoring, gross of ﬁxed costs, for ﬁrm i is given by
B(i)=πV (i) − πD(i)=















where V represents the set of ﬁrms that have oﬀshored using FDI (vertical integration) and NV
is the set of ﬁrms that have not oﬀshored. The above expression is similar to (12) in the text.
Assuming the same distribution of ﬁrm productivity as in the text, we get the following beneﬁt
from oﬀshoring for the nth ﬁrm when n ﬁrms have oﬀshored.
B(n,n)= e B(n)=
α(n)σ−1{(wS + φ)1−σ − 1}λ
(wS + φ)1−σ(ασ − (α − λn)σ)+( ( α − λn)σ − ασ)
(32)
The equilibrium with oﬀshoring is given by
e B(n)=FV (33)
where wS is given by
wS =( 1− θ)w + θ(1 − φ(LV )) (34)





















Equations (33)-(35) determine n,wS, and LV simultaneously.
Thus, while the external economies in production in the South make the beneﬁts curve upward
sloping, the heterogeneity, with ﬁrms lined up in ascending order of their unit costs, makes the
beneﬁts downward sloping. As in the case of the model in the main text, the beneﬁt function
is upward sloping with respect to n in the pure strong external economies case with no ﬁrm
heterogeneity. It is downward sloping when there are no external economies. Clearly, when we
have both ﬁrm heterogeneity and external economies in the South, we need to resort to simulations
to study the shape of the beneﬁts curve. Assuming φ = be−LV , the plot of e B(n) with respect to n,
under plausible parameter values, is an inverted U, and we get similar multiple equilibria as in the
main text.
It can be shown that in this model oﬀshoring beneﬁts both the North and the South. The gains
to the North are obvious as they result from the lower cost of producing the specialized intermediate
good. In the South the gains come from the higher wages of workers working in the production of
specialized intermediate goods for the Northern multinationals. As discussed above, the wage of a
worker producing the specialized intermediate good is
wS =( 1− θ)w + θ(1 − φ(LV )) >w
The total gain to the South is given as follows.
(wS − w)LV = θ(1 − φ(LV ) − w)LV
Therefore, the greater the oﬀshoring the greater the welfare gains for South. Thus, if South is
s t u c ki nan oo ﬀshoring equilibrium due to coordination failure among Northern ﬁrms, then a small
27subsidy to the Northern ﬁrms can cause a large change in the welfare of South. For example,
subsidizing the training cost by giving a payroll subsidy can move the equilibrium from one with
no oﬀs h o r i n gt oo n ew i t hal o to fo ﬀshoring. The model also shows that wage inequality is going to
increase in the South as a result of oﬀshoring. Before oﬀshoring the wage in South is w,h o w e v e r ,
after oﬀshoring LV workers working for multinational ﬁrms earn wS >w ,while the others continue
to earn w.
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31Figure 1:Export and Import of Services by India and Ireland
(in billions of US dollars)

















































































































































































































Outsourcing (Debit)Figure 2: Indian software exports as a share of software sales
Source: Arora and Gambardella (2005)

































Figure 3: Multiple Equilibria Under External Economies 





















n*Figure 5:Multiple equilibria with firm heterogeneity and Externalities
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Parameters: FV=.3,FO=.1,σ =4,β =(σ-1)/ σ, λ =1, α =4, b=1.5,w=.5Figure 10: Equilibrium with FDI and Outsourcing
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